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HABEAS CORPUS: ITS HISTORY
AND ITS FUTURE
Charles Alan Wright*

A

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS.

By William F.

Duker. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1980. Pp. 349. $29.95.
Habeas corpus is in disarray. To many the "Great Writ," as it has been
called by justices from John Marshall1 to Sandra Day O'Connor,2 has lost
its halo. 3 There is _uncertainty about what the function of habeas corpus
ought to be, the Supreme Court vacillates between contracting and expanding the substantive grounds on which the writ will lie, while at the
same time the procedural rules for seeking the writ are consistently being
made more difficult to satisfy. As I have written elsewhere:
The most controversial and friction-producing issue in the relation between the federal courts and the states is federal habeas corpus for state
prisoners. Commentators are critical of its present scope, federal judges
are unhappy at the burden of thousands of mostly frivolous petitions, state
courts resent having their decisions reexamined by a single federal district
judge, and the Supreme Court in recent terms has shown a strong inclination to limit its availability. Meanwhile, prisoners thrive on it as a form of
occupational therapy and for a few it serves as a means of redressing constitutional violations.4
At such a troubled time, the appearance of what is said to be the first
book published on the history of habeas corpus (p. 7) seemed a welcome
event. Perhaps a fuller understanding of what has occurred in the past
would give valuable insight into what the writ ought to be in the future.
That hope was not fulfilled. Indeed Mr. Duker virtually says that it is a
hope that cannot be fulfilled. He is critical of those who "have viewed history as an event rather than as a process and therefore have failed to take
note of the most striking characteristic of the writ of habeas corpus: like
liberty itself, the writ is the product of continuous creation" (p. 7). To him
"[h]istory is studied to give perspective not legitimacy" (p. 267).
The first three chapters, tracing the history of the writ from its English
origins down to the Civil War, are fascinating reading for those who have
* William B. Bates Chair for the Administration of Justice, The University of Texas Law
School. A.B. 1947, Wesleyan University; LL.B. 1949, Yale University. - Ed.
l. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807).
2. Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 15S8 (1982).
3. "There has been a halo about the 'Great Writ' that no one would wish to dim. Yet one
must wonder whether the stretching of its use far beyond any justifiable purpose will not in the
end weaken rather than strengthen the writ's vitality." Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S.
218, 275 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
4. 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURIS·
DICTION S58 (1978) (footnote 01nitted) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT, MILLER'& COOPER].
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not already learned much of this from articles in legal periodicals. The
final three chapters, which in substance carry the story from the Act of February 5, 1867,5 down through the most recent decisions at the time the book
was written, are considerably less satisfying. Unfortunately it is the 1867
statute, giving the federal courts power to grant the writ "in all cases where
any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States"6 that made federal
habeas corpus available to state prisoners. This is the aspect of habeas
corpus that is at the heart of the present controversy and uncertainty.
We think of habeas corpus as an important safeguard of liberty. To
Chief Justice Chase it was "the best and only sufficient defence of personal
freedom." 7 To Chief Justice Warren it was "both the symbol and guardian
of individual liberty." 8 That is certainly not how it began. In a well-known
article at the beginning of this century, Professor Jenks announced a "most
embarrassing discovery, . . . [T]he writ Habeas Corpus was originally intended not to get people out of prison, but to put them in it ."9 In common
with other more recent historians, Mr. Duker argues convincingly that Professor Jenks confused habeas corpus with capias, and that while the two
shared a certain resemblance and at certain periods interacted, they were
distinct forms of process. Unlike capias, seizure pursuant to a writ of
habeas corpus was not an arrest in a technical sense (pp. 19-23).
The excellent chapter on the English origins, however, which had earlier
appeared in a law review, 10 shows that habeas corpus was a prerogative
writ to compel the appearance of persons. The Normans used it to centralize the judicial system by bringing disputes away from the local and manorial courts into the royal courts. From the fifteenth to the seventeenth
centuries the common-law courts used habeas corpus in their battles over
jurisdiction with the Court of Chancery, and, to a lesser extent, the Court of
High Commission, the Court of Admiralty, and the Court of Requests. As
England moved toward Civil War, Parliament attempted to use habeas
corpus in its struggle for power against the King.
This history is fascinating, but if I may borrow a sentence Judge
Friendly wrote about another study of English legal history thought to have
relevance to contemporary American problems, "[a]lthough this history is
absorbing, I do not find it a vade mecum ." 11 Mr. Duker says, for example,
that "[t]he underlying reason for the rule that res judicata had no application to habeas proceedings was that since no appeal against a refusal to
issue the writ or to discharge the prisoner was available, it would have been
intolerable for a person to have the legality of his custody determined con5. Ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
6. Id. This is codified with only verbal changes in 28 U.S.C. § 224l(c)(3) (1976).
1. Ex parle Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868).
8. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58 (1968).
9. Jenks, The Story of the Habeas Corpus, 18 L.Q. REv. 64, 65 (1902) (emphasis in
original).
10. Duker, The English Origins ofthe Writ ofHabeas Corpus: A Peculiar Path lo Fame, 53
N.Y.U. L. REv. 983 (1978).
11. Friendly, The F{fih Amendment Tomollow: The Case far Constitutional Change, 37 U.
CIN. L. REv. 671, 678 (1968).
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elusively by the first judicial body to hear the matter" (pp. 5-6). The
Supreme Court has recognized that the rule about res judicata derives from
this fact at common law, but has thought that not a complete explanation.
"[I]ts roots would seem to go deeper. Conventional notions of finality of
litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of
constitutional rights is alleged." 12 One need not necessarily agree that conventional notions of res judicata should have "no place" in habeas corpus. 13
Still, in light of the drastic change in the function and purpose of the writ,
the fact that, unlike the situation in English common law, appeal is now
ordinarily available from a refusal to issue the writ 14 hardly seems decisive
on what weight, if any, should be given to prior determinations.
Mr. Duker continues by recounting the extension of habeas corpus to
the British colonies in North America and the inclusion of the suspension
clause in the Constitution. 15 He concludes, as do many scholars, that the
constitutional language was not intended to guarantee a federal writ of
habeas corpus but only to limit the circumstances in which Congress could
interfere with the issuance of state writs of habeas corpus. The argument is
plausible, but this has not been the Supreme Court's understanding. Although Chief Justice Marshall said that the power to award the writ by any
of the courts of the United States must be given by written law, he considered that the Constitution imposed on Congress "the obligation of providing efficient means by which this great constitutional privilege should
receive life and activity. . . ." 16 The argument is advanced today that the
suspension clause does not require Congress to provide a federal remedy
for collateral review of a conviction entered by a court of competent jurisdiction, but this is on the view that the Constitution protects only the scope
of the writ as it was known at the time the Constitution was drafted, rather
than on any theory that the Constitution is speaking only to habeas corpus
from a state court and not to federal habeas corpus.17
As a part of this argument against Marshall's reading of the Constitution as imposing an obligation on Congress, Mr. Duker points out that by
the time the Constitutional Convention came to consider habeas corpus, it
had already firmly fixed upon the idea that it was to be optional with Congress whether to create any lower federal courts (p. 127). This demonstrates, he says, "that the 'obligation theory' espoused by Marshall . . . is
questionable, since Congress was without power to impose jurisdiction on
the state courts" (p. 157 n.13). For that proposition he cites a gratuitous
dictum from Justice Washington.1 8 It is true that through the first part of
12. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963).
13. See Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Co/lateral A/lack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.
CHI. L. REV. 142, 149-50 (1970).
14. A certificate of probable cause is required. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976).
15. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 2: "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."
16. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 95. See also Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S.
236, 238 (1963).
11. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 384-85 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Bounds
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 835 (1977) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
18. "For I hold it to be perfectly clear, that Congress cannot confer jurisdiction upon any
Courts, but such as exist under the constitution and laws of the United States, although the
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the nineteenth century until the 1860s there were instances in which the
Supreme Court "and state courts broadly questioned the power and duty of
state courts to . . . enforce United States civil and penal statutes or the
power of the Federal Government to require them to do so." 19 That question has long since been resolved, and it is now clear, as history shows the
Framers must have contemplated, that Congress has always had power to
require state courts to entertain claims created by federal statute.20
At several points in this portion of the book Mr. Duker takes issue with
the quite different interpretation of the historical evidence in a well-known
article by Francis Paschal, The Consitution and Habeas Corpus. 21 Unfortunately both in the text (p. 136) and at twelve places in the footnotes and
Bibliography, Duker refers to "Pascal" and the title of the article is given as
"Habeas Corpus and the Constitution." Ordinarily I would think it infra
dig for a reviewer even to take note of insignificant errors of this kind, but
in this instance I think it needs to be mentioned. Much of the historical
material in the first half of this book is derived from original research by
Mr. Duker into the primary materials, the ancient records themselves. I am
not trained as a historian and am obliged to rely on secondary sources such
as his book. But when I find that he consistently makes an obvious error in
citing a modem, easily checked source, what confidence can I have that he
has not made similar mistakes in reporting his :findings from the materials I
cannot check?22
In the final three chapters of the book Mr. Duker is, for the most part,
writing about current events, not history. I agree with another reviewer
who has observed that "[t]he treatment here is at times disappointing, at
least to lawyers who demand the thorough research and analytical precision
that the historian seeking overview tends to neglect."23 The literature
abounds with articles that have analyzed these recent developments more
thoroughly and more thoughtfully, nor is Mr. Duker's presentation
strengthened by his partisanship for one particular point of view. 24
Whatever the historical origins of habeas corpus may have been, in the
State Courts may exercise jurisdiction on cases authorized by the laws of the state, and not
prohibited by the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal Courts." Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 1, 27-28 (1820). Justice Washington later notes that the members of the Court who
agree with the result announced in his opinion "do not concur in all respects in the reasons
which influence my opinion." 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 32. See also the discussion of the Houston
case in Currie, 'I7ze Constitution in the Supreme Court: 'I7ze Powers ofthe Federal Courts, 18311835, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 646, 702-05 (1982).
19. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 390 (1947) (footnote omitted).
20. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS§ 45 (4th ed. 1983).
21. 1970 DUKE LJ. 605.
22. There are other instances of obvious sloppiness in the book. Justice Black is quoted (p.
7) as speaking of "the protection of the individual against erosion of their right. . . ." Of
course he said "individuals." Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 246 (1963). When Mr.
Duker uses the famous quotation from Professor Jenks that I have quoted in the text accompanying note 9 supra, he inserts an "of' in it that does not appear in the original (p. 13).
23. Yackle, Book Review, 17 CRIM. L. BULL. 479, 487 (1981) (footnote omitted).
24. A Canadian law professor, reviewing Mr. Duker's book for a British audience, says:
"The author's uncritical enthusiasm for judicial activism and his almost mystical belief in the
power of habeas corpus may seem odd to non-American readers." Sharpe, Book Review, PuB.
L., Spring 1982, at 154, 156.
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United States today the function of the writ is thought to be "the protection
of individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty," 25 or, more guardedly, as "a bulwark against
convictions that violate 'fundamental fairness.' " 26 Yet it still retains something of its ancient character as a weapon for jurisdictional disputes between branches or levels of government. As the author aptly says:
"Throughout this century in the United States, habeas corpus has been the
medium of the dialogue of federalism between the federal and state courts"
'(p. 156). The expansion of the writ in the 1950s and 1960s has strengthened
the federal courts at the expense of their state counterparts and has been a
means for imposing federal constitutional standards on state criminal
proceedings.
As noted at the outset of this review, these developments have stirred
much controversy. There has been a countermovement, particularly since
1976, but it is unclear how far it will go and there is no agreement on where
it should go. On the one hand, for example, Judge Friendly's suggestion
that for the most part convictions should be subject to collateral attack only
when the prisoner supplements his constitutional plea with a colorable
claim of innocence27 has found sympathetic listeners in high places. 28 Yet
in an important recent book, my colleague, Philip Bobbitt, has made quite a
contrary suggestion. He thinks that the view that moral arguments should
generally be excluded from the constitutional discourse
justifies, for example, the phenomenon of federal habeas corpus, for which
it is otherwise difficult to give good grounds. Habeas corpus severs the
constitutional decision from the moral question of guilt or innocence, so
that the former can be dispassionately weighed as one suspects it seldom
can be in the context of a trial. At the same time federal habeas corpus
gives the matter to a group of deciders whose customary business is, by
comparison to state courts, largely amoral. It is the state courts that must
confront questions of moral blame, broken promises, negligent or intentional harm, marital collapse, and virtually all crime. The federal courts,
on the other hand, except for their diversity jurisdiction, are largely given
over to matters of government regulation, intergovernmental conflict, and
national commerce. Federal habeas corpus enables the constitutional
questions to be given the priority they can seldom achieve when held in the
balance with a moral conviction widely enough shared to have found its
way into a state's criminal code.29
Professor Bobbitt's point is a thoughtful one, and merits careful
consideration.
The changes in habeas corpus in the past seven years have not all been
in one direction. In terms of the substantive grounds for which the writ will
lie, the best known case is Stone v. Powel!, 30 holding that fourth amend25. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. at 243 (1963).
26. Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. at 1570 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97
(1977)).
27. Friendly, supra note 13, at 142.
28. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 265-66 (Powell, J.,joined by Burger, C.J.,
and Rehnquist, J., concurring).
29. P. BOBBIIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 140 (1982).
30. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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ment claims may not be heard on habeas corpus if the state has provided an
opportunity for full and fair litigation of the claim. To Mr. Duker: "Stone
v. Powell represented the triumph of those who had been working to block
the expansion of federal habeas jurisdiction which the Warren Court had
accelerated to insure the transmission of its concept of criminal justice to
the state court" (p. 264). Yet it seemed when Stone came down that it was
bottomed on dislike for the exclusionary rule, rather than of habeas corpus,
and the Court has refused to extend the full and fair opportunity rule to
other constitutional violations, explaining that in Stone it had "made it
clear that it was confining its ruling to cases involving the judicially created
exclusionary rule. . . ." 31 The Court has also refused to make clear what it
means by "full and fair opportunity" despite the varied views on this point
in the circuits.32
In Rose v. Mitchel/ 33 and Jackson v. Virginia 34 the Court has held that
habeas corpus will lie in circumstances where previously it had not been
thought to be available. The decision in Rose, that the writ will run if there
is racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreman even
though there was no constitutional impropriety in the selection of the petit
jury and guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial free
from constitutional error, can be explained in terms of the abhorrence with
which we view racial discrimination of any kind, and especially discrimination that infects the judicial system. The ruling in Jackson, however, that a
prisoner is entitled to the federal writ if it is found that upon the evidence
adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, seems a triumph oflogic over practicality. The
Jackson Court recognized that "most meritorious challenges to constitutional sufficiency of the evidence undoubtedly will be recognized in the
state courts . . . ."35 That is clearly true. But since this new ground is one
that can plausibly be asserted by very many state prisoners and it is one that
a federal court cannot ordinarily reject without first reading the entire record of the state trial, the effect is to burden the courts without any significant benefit to anyone. My purpose here, however, is not to argue the
merits of these cases, but only to show that the Court has not moved
monolithically in a single direction with regard to the substantive grounds
for habeas in the recent cases.
- On the procedural side, however, the recent decisions have all gone one
way, and have created an increasingly difficult set of barriers that a state
prisoner must overcome before a federal court will be allowed to decide
whether his constitutional claim has any merit. The statute itself requires
that the prisoner exhaust his state remedies before seeking habeas corpus.36
The exhaustion requirement cannot be ignored no matter how clear the
31. Rose v. Mitchell, 433 U.S. 545, 560 (1979).
32. See Justice White's dissent from denial of certiorari in Shoemaker v. Riley, 103 S. Ct.
266 (1982).
33. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
34. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
35. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 322.
36. 28 u.s.c. § 2254(b), (c) (1976). See 17 WRIGHT, MlLLER & COOPER, supra note 4, at
§4264.
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violation of the prisoner's constitutional rights. 37 Nor is the requirement
satisfied unless the prisoner has fairly presented the same claim to the state
court that he makes to the federal court.38 But it was only "the substance"
of the claim that must first be presented to the state courts and it was not
necessary that the prisoner have cited "book and verse on the federal constitution."39 Today that rule is applied with great severity, and a petition
must be dismissed if there is any significant difference between the phrasing
of the claim in federal court and in state court, no matter how unlikely it
may be that the state court would have reached another result if the claim
to it had been in the words later used in federal court.40
Most of the circuits had thought that if a prisoner presented a "mixed
petition," in which state remedies had been exhausted on some claims but
not on others, they could reach the merits of the exhausted claims while
dismissing the unexhausted claims.41 That view has now been rejected. Total exhaustion is required. The prisoner has the choice of postponing his
attempt to get federal relief until he has gone back to state court and exhausted the remaining claims or of resubmitting to the federal court a petition presenting only the exhausted claims.42 There are great hazards in the
latter course for the prisoner, because four members of the Court have said
that ifhe resubmits his exhausted claims and is unsuccessful, and thereafter
he exhausts his state remedies on the other claims and presents them to the
federal court in a later habeas corpus petition, he may have that later petition dismissed under Habeas Corpus Rule 9(b) on the ground that his failure to present the claims in his earlier petition was an abuse of the writ.43
Even the prisoner who masters the intricacies of exhaustion is not out of
the woods. If the prisoner has been successful when he presented his constitutional contention to the state court, he will have been released, or retried,
and has no need to resort to federal court. Applications for habeas corpus
come, then, only where the state court has rejected the constitutional contention or for some reason or another has failed to pass on it.
If the state court has rejected the constitutional contention, its findings
of fact are presumed to be correct, and the prisoner has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the determination is erroneous, unless one of eight circumstances specified by statute exist. 44 In a case
that has twice gone back and forth between the Ninth Circuit and the
Supreme Court, new teeth have been put in that statute. It has been held
37. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. I (1981).
38. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971).
39. 404 U.S. at 278 (quoting Daugherty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958)),
40. Anderson v. Harless, 103 S. Ct. 276 (1982).
41. 17 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 4, at 640-43.
42. Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982). See also Bergman v. Burton, 102 S. Ct. 2026
(1982).
43. Rose v. Lundy, 102 s. Ct. at 1204-05. See 17 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note
4, at §4267.
44. 28
§ 4265.

u.s.c.

§ 2254(d) (1976). See 17 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 4, at
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applicable even to findings by a state appellate court45 and while it remains
the rule that the statute does not apply to a state court determination of a
mixed question of law and fact, the Court has taken a strict view on
whether the federal court was disagreeing with the state court on the ultimate mixed question, to which the statute does not apply, or to the questions of fact that underlie that ultimate question, where the statute is
applicable.46
.
If the state court has not decided the federal claim, it will be because the
prisoner has not asserted it properly in state court or because there is some
adequate state ground that supports the conviction. This is the "abortive
state proceeding" about which the permissive view taken in Fay v. Noia 41
has been virtually supplanted by the holding in Wainwright v. Sykes 48 that
federal relief can be had only if there is a showing of "cause" for the prisoner's failure to raise the issue properly at his trial and also a showing of
actual prejudice. Although Wainwright did not define what was meant by
"cause" and "prejudice," more recent cases have given meanings to those
terms, and the meanings are not comforting to prisoners. The futility of
presenting an objection to the state courts cannot alone constitute cause for
a failure to object at trial, nor is it sufficient cause that defendant's lawyer
was unaware of the basis for an objection if other defense lawyers have
perceived and litigated the claim.49 A claim of prejudice must be evaluated
in the total context of the events at trial and a defendant must show "not
merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that
they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire
trial with error of constitutional dimensions." 50
Much can be said for each of these decisions, viewed individually.
Taken as a group they seem questionable. Most habeas corpus petitions are
filed by untutored laymen, not versed in the niceties of these elaborate procedural doctrines. Years ago Justice Rutledge described the Illinois system
of post-conviction remedies as a "procedural labyrinth . . . made up entirely of blind alleys." 51 For many state prisoners federal habeas corpus
will now seem to merit a similar description. It is not obvious that it is a
wise use of precious federal judicial time, or a service to the states and the
notion of federalism, to have many or most habeas corpus petitions disposed of on procedural grounds. If the federal courts are free to reach the
merits, they will find in the overwhelming bulk of the cases that the petition
should be denied because the state courts have faithfully applied the commands of the Federal Constitution. A rebuff to the prisoner on procedural
grounds leaves a cloud, however frivolous, over the state conviction and is
45. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981), on remand, 649 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated
and remanded per curiam, 102 S. Ct. 1303 (1982).
46. Sumner v. Mata, 102 S. Ct. 1303 (1982), vacating and remanding per curiam 649 F.2d
713 (9th Cir. 1981). The statute was also given a strict construction in Marshall v. Lonberger,
51 U.S.L.W. 4113 (1983).
47. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
48. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
49. Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982).
50. United States v. Frady, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1596 (1982) (emphasis in original).
51. Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 567 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
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simply an invitation to the prisoner to try and try again in the hope that
sometime, somehow, he can push the right combination of buttons and obtain a decision on the merits.
In my view the proper resolution of the continuing controversy about
habeas corpus will come only when there is substantial consensus on what
its proper function is in a federal system in the late twentieth century. What
happened when the Normans conquered England, though very interesting
in its own right, does not seem to be of much help in achieving that consensus. If there can be substantial agreement on the function of the writ, the
substantive grounds on which it is to be available should fall readily in
place. Finally a set of procedural rules are needed that will be clear, that
will be understandable to prisoners, and that will give a fair opportunity to
resolve constitutional contentions on their merits.
Such a solution is far more likely to be achieved by legislation than it is
by episodic decisionmaking. The Department of Justice and the Senate
have been working in this direction. 52 There is so much emotion about
habeas corpus that the legislative proposals now pending are certain to
arouse vigorous opposition from those who tend to rhapsodize about the
Great Writ and to lament any attempt to confine it in any way. My hope is
not that the present proposals will be adopted intact, but that they will stimulate a dialogue in which open-minded and responsible people will be able
to agree on what habeas corpus should be in the future. Mr. Duker's history has shown that the single most striking fact about habeas corpus over
the years has been its ability to change. Presumably it retains that ability,
and must do so if it is to meet the needs of today and tomorrow.

52. S. 2838, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). See 128
21, 1982).
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